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There are a number of examples in the auction literature (Perry and Reny, 1999, and Krishna,
2002) where releasing the seller's private information can lead to a lowering of expected
revenue. On the other hand, releasing information always increases welfare. Levin and Smith
(1994) point out that when entry is endogenous (and the entry decision is made before one
observes one's signal), revenue and welfare objectives coincide. Therefore, revealing
information will always increase revenue when we can use entry fees to capture all bidders'
rents.
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One of the biggest discoveries of auction theory after the revenue equivalence theorem
is the linkage principle. The linkage principle suggests that the more the information
provided to the bidders in an auction the greater the revenue (Milgrom and Weber,
1982). Recently, however, the linkage principle has been shown to be violated in the
multi-unit framework. More precisely, Perry and Reny (1999) show that in multi-unit
auctions revealing the seller’s information may lead to a change in the ordering of the
bids, thereby, lowering the expected revenue. Krishna (2002) shows that the switch in
the ranking of bids that drives the example of Perry and Reny does not need multiple
units to take place. It can happen in single object auctions, as well, thereby violating
the linkage principle. In Krishna’s example with two bidders only one bidder has a
private value (in Perry and Reny both bidders have a private value, but only for the
second unit). However, as Board (2004) shows, even that is not necessary. The change
in the ranking of bids as a result of seller’s private information is possible when both
bidders have private values which in turn may cause a violation of the linkage principle.
Moreover, the eﬀect of the change in the ranking of bids is the strongest when there
are two bidders in the auction (in the sense that it cannot be balanced by any other
change).
In this paper, we consider auctions where entry of bidders is endogenously deter-
mined due to the presence of entry costs. We show that the linkage principle continues
to hold when entry is endogenous even if revelation of the seller’s private information
gives rise to a switch in the ranking of the bids in the auction. Furthermore, we show
that if the seller can charge the optimal entry fee revelation of the seller’s information
always increases the expected revenue, thereby restoring the linkage principle. The
intuition behind this is simple. When entry is endogenous, the objectives of the seller
and the social planner become perfectly aligned even when bidders are asymmetric.
Therefore, the seller prefers the eﬃcient outcome that is brought about by the release
of the private information. This intuition extends to the case of more than two bidders,
as well.2. The Linkage Principle With Entry
The formal model of entry is the asymmetric version of the entry model of Levin and
Smith (1994). A seller has an indivisible item and a privately observed random signal
s. There are 2 potential bidders. The bidders simultaneously choose entry probabilities
p1 and p2.W h e nb i d d e ri enters the auction he incurs a cost of entry ci and observes
a private signal Xi that is a random variable. The participating bidders then bid in an
English auction with a zero reserve. The value of the object to bidder i is ui(Xi,s).I t
is possible, for instance, that Esu1(X1,s) >E su2(X2,s) but that u1(X1,s) <u 2(X2,s)
where EZ is the expectation operator over Z. Thus, a release of information may lead
to a switch of private values (which is then bound to cause a violation of the linkage
principle in the absence of entry costs). In short, we do not make any assumption to
preserve the linkage principle in the case where two bidders participate with probability
one in the auction.
We say that entry is endogenous in the auction when the participation probability
of each bidder depends on the participation probability of the other bidder. In other
words, entry is endogenous if in equilibrium bidder i enters with probability pi and
a change in pi makes bidder j’s choice of participation probability pj suboptimal. In
such a situation a bidder typically earn’s a zero ex ante payoﬀ. Therefore, in general,
we will say that participation in the auction is endogenous if in equilibrium bidder i
(i =1 ,2) is indiﬀerent between participating and not participating. Since in the auction
itself bidding the expected private value of the object is a weakly dominant strategy we
formally deﬁne participation to be endogenous in the case where the seller’s information
is not released, if for i 6= j we have
(1 − pj)EXi,sui(Xi,s)+pjP[Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)] (1)
×EXi,Xj[Esui(Xi,s) − Esuj(Xj,s)|Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)] = ci
Note that in this case entry need not always be endogenous. Our ﬁrst result will,
however, be true only when entry is endogenous, i.e., the parameters of the model
allow the above condition to be satisﬁed for some pi ∈ [0,1], i =1 ,2.
2If the seller can also charge a bidder speciﬁce n t r yf e eei that is payable at the time
of entry and the entry fees are set at the optimal level to maximize revenue then the
condition
(1 − pj)EXi,sui(Xi,s)+pjP[Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)] (2)
×EXi,Xj[Esui(Xi,s) − Esuj(Xj,s)|Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)] = ci + ei
must be satisﬁed.1 Observe that when the seller can charge the optimal entry fee the
above equation will always be satisﬁed, i.e., entry will always be endogenous, whenever
the bidders ﬁnd it worthwhile to participate in the auction in the absence of the entry
cost and entry fees (so that the linkage principle is a relevant issue in the auction).2
Rather than thinking of the seller as setting the optimal entry fee, let us think of her
as setting the participation rates and collecting the corresponding entry fees. Setting
of optimal entry fees in that case is synonymous with setting the optimal participation
rates. Now equation (2) can be rewritten as
(1 − pj)EXi,sui(Xi,s)+pjP[Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)]
× EXi,Xj[Esui(Xi,s)|Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)] − ci
= pjP[Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)]EXi,Xj[Esuj(Xj,s)|Esui(Xi,s) >E suj(Xj,s)] + ei
which upon being multiplied by pi and summed for i =1 ,2 becomes
p1(1 − p2)EX1,su1(X1,s)+p2(1 − p1)EX2,su2(X2,s)
+ p1p2EX1,X2[max{Esu1(X1,s),E su2(X2,s)}] − p1c1 − p2c2
= p1p2EX1,X2[min{Esu1(X1,s),E su2(X2,s)}]+p1e1 + p2e2
1Note that the equilibrium entry probabilities are determined by the equilibrium condition (1) when
the seller cannot charge an entry fee and condition (2) when the seller can charge an entry fee satisfy
the inequalities 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, i =1 ,2. Thus, whether a pure strategy or a mixed strategy equilibrium
exists depends on the value of p1 and p2 determined by the equilibrium condition. For instance, if the
equilibrium conditions give p1 = p2 =1it is a pure strategy equilibrium, and it is a mixed strategy
equilibrium when 0 <p i < 1, i =1 ,2. In particular, the existence of a given type of equilibrium
depends on the existence of the relevant solution of the equilibrium condition.
2In other words, unlike Proposition 1, Proposition 2 in the next section will hold very generally.
3where the right hand side is the expected revenue to the seller and the left hand side
is the expected social surplus. Similarly, when the seller’s information is released the
corresponding equation becomes
ˆ p1(1 − ˆ p2)EX1,su1(X1,s)+ˆ p2(1 − ˆ p1)EX2,su2(X2,s)
+ˆ p1ˆ p2EX1,X2,s[max{u1(X1,s),u 2(X2,s)}] − ˆ p1c1 − ˆ p2c2
=ˆ p1ˆ p2EX1,X2,s[min{u1(X1,s),u 2(X2,s)}]+ˆ p1ˆ e1 +ˆ p2ˆ e2
Clearly, the participation rates that maximize the right hand side of the equations also
maximize the left hand side of the equations. Now suppose that pi-s and ˆ pi-s maximize
the left hand sides of the above two equations. We have, since “max”i sac o n v e x
function, that
ˆ p1(1 − ˆ p2)EX1,su1(X1,s)+ˆ p2(1 − ˆ p1)EX2,su2(X2,s)
+ˆ p1ˆ p2EX1,X2,s[max{u1(X1,s),u 2(X2,s)}] − ˆ p1c1 − ˆ p2c2
≥ p1(1 − p2)EX1,su1(X1,s)+p2(1 − p1)EX2,su2(X2,s)
+ p1p2EX1,X2,s[max{u1(X1,s),u 2(X2,s)}] − p1c1 − p2c2
≥ p1(1 − p2)EX1,su1(X1,s)+p2(1 − p1)EX2,su2(X2,s)
+ p1p2EX1,X2[max{Esu1(X1,s),E su2(X2,s)}] − p1c1 − p2c2.
It follows that
ˆ p1ˆ p2EX1,X2,s[min{u1(X1,s),u 2(X2,s)}]+ˆ p1ˆ e1 +ˆ p2ˆ e2 (3)
≥ p1p2EX1,X2[min{Esu1(X1,s),E su2(X2,s)}]+p1e1 + p2e2.
When entry is endogenous, so that without the entry fee equation (1) is satisﬁed in equi-
librium, then it can be checked that the optimal entry fees are equal to zero. Therefore,
in that case, the equilibrium participation rates are the same regardless of whether the
seller can or cannot charge entry fees. In other words, when entry is endogenous we
have
ˆ p1ˆ p2EX1,X2,s[min{u1(X1,s),u 2(X2,s)}] ≥ p1p2EX1,X2[min{Esu1(X1,s),E su2(X2,s)}].
4F o r m a l l y ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Proposition 1. If entry in the auctions is endogenous, with and without the seller
releasing her private signal, then the expected revenue to the seller increases when her
private information is released.
In fact when the seller can charge the optimal entry fees equation (2) holds regardless
of whether or not entry is endogenous in the absence of the entry fees. Thus, we have
the following result.
Proposition 2. If the seller can charge the bidder speciﬁc optimal entry fees in the
auction then a public release of the seller’s information increases the expected revenue.
3. Discussion
The results can be viewed from the perspective of the entry costs. When the entry
costs are small entry is not endogenous in the sense that a bidder need not care about
the participation rate of the other bidder. In that case, the linkage principle may fail.
However, if entry is endogenous then the linkage principle continues to hold. Moreover,
if the seller can charge the optimal entry fees in the auction then the release of seller’s
information increases the expected revenue regardless of the entry costs.
While endogenizing entry in the asymmetric single-object private-value auctions
returns the linkage principle, it is not diﬃcult to construct examples to show that this
need not be enough to salvage the linkage principle in the multi-unit case Perry and
Reny (1999). What or what else is necessary to restore the linkage principle in that
case continues to remain an open question.
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